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Abstract
The patent system is broken and in dire need of reform; so says the
popular press, scholars, lawyers, judges, congresspersons, and even the
President. One common complaint is that patents are now failing as
property rights because their boundaries are not as clear as the fences
that demarcate real estate—patent infringement is neither as determinate
nor as efficient as trespass is for land. This Essay explains that this is a
fallacious argument, suffering both empirical and logical failings.
Empirically, there are no formal studies of trespass litigation rates; thus,
complaints about the patent system’s indeterminacy are based solely on
an idealized theory of how trespass should function, which economists
identify as the “nirvana fallacy.” Furthermore, anecdotal evidence and
other studies suggest that boundary disputes between landowners are
neither as clear nor as determinate as patent scholars assume them to be.
Logically, the comparison of patent boundaries to trespass commits
what philosophers call a “category mistake.” It conflates the boundaries
of an entire legal right (a patent), not with the boundaries of its
conceptual counterpart (real estate), but with a single doctrine (trespass)
that secures real estate only in a single dimension (physical fences). As
all law students learn in their first-year Property courses, estate
boundaries are defined along the dimensions of time, use, and space, as
represented in doctrines like future interests, easements, nuisance, and
restrictive covenants, among others. The proper conceptual analog for
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patent boundaries is “estate boundaries,” not fences. In sum, the trespass
fallacy is driving widely accepted critiques of today’s patent system that
are empirically unverified and conceptually misleading.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom today is that the patent system is broken
and it needs to be fixed. It is expressed in both the popular press1 and
academic scholarship.2 In a series of high-profile judicial opinions,
articles and blog postings, Judge Richard Posner has been criticizing the
“serious problems with our patent system.”3 The Supreme Court
appears to agree, as it is now deciding patent cases at a rate not seen
since the nineteenth century.4 In just the October 2012 Term, the Court
1. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giantscan-stifle-competition.html; Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/all; James Temple,
Google Lawyer: Why the Patent System is Broken, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2011, at E1, available
at 2011 WLNR 22874588; Tim Worstall, The Patent System Really Is Broken if Someone Is
Trolling Apple for This, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/
11/29/the-patent-system-really-is-broken-if-someone-is-trolling-apple-for-this.
2. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2–3 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 1, 4–6 (2009); ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM
IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 171 (2004).
3. Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12,
2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-toomany-patents-in-america/259725/; accord Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls—Posner, BECKERPOSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patenttrollsposner.html; see Dan Levine, Judge Who Shelved Apple Trial Says Patent System Out of
Sync, REUTERS (July 5, 2012, 8:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-applegoogle-judge-idUSBRE8640IQ20120705?irpc=932.
4. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 321, 321–22 (2009) (comparing seven cert grants between 2005 and 2008 to the eight
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foreclosed the patent system to discoveries of isolated DNA and
imposed antitrust review of settlements of patent infringement lawsuits
involving pharmaceutical drugs.5 Regulatory agencies also have skin in
the patent reform game: In January 2013, the Federal Trade
Commission reached a settlement with Google in which the firm agreed
to restrict its enforcement of patents committed to standard setting
organizations,6 and the agency is now considering whether to bring
enforcement actions against patent licensing companies.7 Congress was
even awoken from its deadlocked slumber by the clarion call for reform
of the patent system, enacting the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).8
On February 14, 2013, President Barack Obama declared that even the
AIA was not enough, stating “that our efforts at patent reform only went
about halfway to where we need to go.”9 By mid-summer 2013, six bills
were formally introduced in Congress to further revise the patent
system.10
The complaints today about the patent system run the gamut—from
patents being granted on discoveries or inventions that should be
excluded from the patent system11 to massive litigation in the “smart
cases decided by the Court in 1853). Between 2009 and 2013, the Court decided twelve patent
cases.
See
Supreme
Court
Patent
Cases,
WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION,
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html#!/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2013) (listing cases). In the nineteenth century, the Court did not have discretionary
control over its docket, and thus it heard numerous patent cases. See John F. Duffy, The Federal
Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (2010).
5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(holding that discoveries of isolated DNA are unpatentable); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (holding that “reverse settlements” in pharmaceutical patent litigation are subject to
antitrust review).
6. See Motorola Mobility, LLC, FTC File No. 121-0120 (July 23, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf (final decision and order
amending and replacing decision and order first issued on January 3, 2013).
7. See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Patent
Assertion Entity Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012) (transcript at 4), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/121210paeworkshop.pdf.
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
9. Casey Newton, Obama: We’re Only Halfway There on Patent Reform, CNET (Feb.
14, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57569499-93/obama-were-onlyhalfway-there-on-patent-reform/.
10. Robert Wager, Survey of Proposed Patent Lawsuit Reform Bills in Congress (Part 3),
PIT IP TECH BLOG (July 25, 2013), http://pitiptechblog.com/2013/07/25/survey-of-proposedpatent-lawsuit-reform-bills-in-congress-part-3.
11. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (rejecting as
an unpatentable “law of nature” a medical treatment method covering correlations of doses of
medication with toxicity levels in the blood); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (rejecting
as an unpatentable “abstract idea” a business method covering hedging of risk in the sale of
commodities).
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phone wars” allegedly imposing ruinous costs on inventors and firms.12
But one common refrain is that patents are now just too vague and
indeterminate to function properly as property rights. This
“indeterminacy critique” undergirds many of the complaints about why
the patent system is broken; for instance, Justice Anthony Kennedy has
complained that improperly granted patents on business methods are a
problem because they are vague and indeterminate.13
The indeterminacy critique has particular traction in the public
policy debates about software patents, and commentators have proposed
reforms ranging from outright elimination of software patents to
doctrinal tweaks in how software patents are issued and enforced.14
Academic conferences are now dedicated solely to how best to fix “the
software patent problem,”15 and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
has held a series of roundtable discussions “to enhance the quality of
software-related patents.”16 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held out hope that it would resolve the issue of whether software
patents are valid in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.17 But the en
banc court fractured badly on the question—no opinion garnered a
majority on the question of whether software patents are valid—which
ensured only ongoing uncertainty and a cert petition to the Supreme
Court.18
More generally, the indeterminacy critique is compelling in the
patent policy debates because patents are legal documents that must be
interpreted by judges, investors, competitors, and inventors in various
institutional and market contexts. In patent litigation, the interpretation
12. See, e.g., Paul Barrett, Apple’s Patent War Seen Leading to Retaliatory Strikes,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0329/apple.html.
13. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (complaining about the “potential vagueness and suspect validity” of “patents over
business methods”).
14. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 187–214 (discussing generally the many
problems caused by “abstract” and vague software patent claims); Mark A. Lemley, Software
Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No.
2117302, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302 (proposing limiting software patents through
a stricter interpretation of § 112 of the 1952 Patent Act); Mark Cuban, My Suggestion on Patent
Law, BLOG MAVERICK (Aug. 7, 2011, 1:58 PM), http://blogmaverick.com/2011/08/07/mysuggestion-on-patent-law (proposing eliminating software patents in part because “[u]ncertainty
is never good”).
15. See Solutions to the Software Patent Problem, SANTA CLARA L. (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://law.scu.edu/hightech/2012-solutions-to-the-software-patent-problem.cfm.
16. See Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for
Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 292–93 (Jan. 3, 2013).
17. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
18. See 82 U.S.L.W. 359 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2013) (No. 13-298).
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of patents by courts, especially of the patent claims that define the
“metes and bounds” of the property right in the invention,19 is viewed
by many scholars as being in disarray. Recent studies report that the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate on claim interpretation issues is between
33.3% and 44%.20 Some studies report that the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of a patent is heavily panel dependent.21 One former
federal district court judge, Samuel Kent, famously complained after a
string of reversals that the Federal Circuit is full of “little green men
who don’t know Tuesday from Philadelphia.”22 Some patent scholars
thus refer to patents as “probabilistic” or “contingent” property rights
because they argue that the precise scope of the property right is unclear
until an infringement lawsuit has run its full course, including the result
of the inevitable—and unpredictable—appeal to the Federal Circuit.23
Many other scholars have responded to these criticisms with
counter-studies of patents,24 but this Essay makes a more fundamental
point: the indeterminacy critique is deeply mistaken in a way that
cannot be corrected by merely producing more empirical studies of the
patent system. To be clear, the indeterminacy critique as such is not
improper or invalid. The lack of clarity in the law is a legitimate basis
for calls for reform. But the indeterminacy critique, like all normative
evaluations, is based on a standard of judgment. The indeterminacy
critique is based on the assumption that patents should function just as
trespass doctrine does in real property—the former should be as clear
and as determinate as the latter. This appeal to trespass is fundamentally
mistaken on both conceptual and empirical grounds, and as a result it
has produced an unsound and unverified normative critique in the patent
19. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
20. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting 44% rate in appellate
modifications of district courts’ claim constructions); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight
Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233
(2005) (reporting a 34.5% claim construction reversal rate); Michael Saunders, Note, A Survey
of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 236 (2007) (reporting
a 33.3% claim construction reversal rate); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the
Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 711, 745–46 (2003) (reporting a 41.5% claim construction reversal rate).
21. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163 (2004).
22. Victoria Slind-Flor, The ‘Markman’ Prophecies, LAW.COM (Mar. 12, 2002),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005528997.
23. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probablistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75
(Spring 2005).
24. See, e.g., Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and
Software Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 67 (reporting that PTO rejection rates for
patent applications on software are consistent with other technologies).
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policy debates that is driving court decisions, agency actions, and
legislation.
This Essay will explain in three Parts how patent law scholarship
and jurisprudence is dominated by a “trespass fallacy” and why this
matters. First, it will describe how judges and commentators have long
analogized patent infringement to trespass, and how the indeterminacy
critique turns this analogy on its head by converting it into an allegedly
robust normative standard of evaluation. The result is a fallacy—what
this Essay calls the “trespass fallacy.” It is a fallacy in two respects: one
is conceptual and the other is empirical, and the last two Parts of this
Essay will explain why this is so. The conceptual error consists of what
philosophers call a “category mistake.” It conflates an entire legal right
(title) with a single doctrine (trespass) that secures this title only in a
single dimension (geographic boundaries). In sum, it compares two
legal concepts that are incommensurate with each other. The empirical
error is that there are no formal empirical studies of how trespass or
other real estate boundaries function in litigation; thus, the
indeterminacy critique uses only an idealized theory of how trespass is
supposed to function as an alleged empirical standard of comparison in
evaluating the efficiency of the patent system. Economists have long
identified this improper comparison between idealized theory and
empirical reality as a “nirvana fallacy.”25 In sum, the trespass fallacy is
driving an indeterminacy critique in patent law that is unverified and
misleading. In the words of the advocates of the indeterminacy critique,
it “substitutes rhetoric for reasoned policy.”26
I. PATENTS AS TITLE DEEDS AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS
TRESPASS
It is neither surprising nor unusual for courts and commentators
today to analogize patent infringement to trespass. Patents have long
been identified as property rights in American law. Early American
courts conceptualized patents in the same terms as common law
property rights, and thus they relied on and employed concepts,
doctrines, and rhetoric from real property in crafting the doctrines that
now comprise the American patent system.27
25. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1, 1–2 (1969).
26. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 257 (“The problem with mistaking abstract
conceptions of property for the real thing is that this substitutes rhetoric for reasoned
policy . . . .”).
27. See Adam Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions: Lessons for
Modern Patent Theory from Classic Patent Doctrine, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 345, 345–77 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D.
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From the very first years of the American patent system, courts
identified patents as “titles” or “title deeds.”28 To take just one
illustrative example: In 1848, Justice Levi Woodbury, riding circuit,
instructed a jury in a patent infringement trial that “[a]n inventor holds a
property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm
and flock.”29 Patent infringement was thus analogized to “trespass”30
because, as Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, explained in
1817, a violation of a patent is “an unlawful invasion of property.”31
This historical practice of conceptualizing patents as title deeds and
analogizing patent infringement as trespass continued into the twentieth
century. The Supreme Court embraced it at the turn of the twentieth
century,32 and, following its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit
continued this practice, referring repeatedly to patent claims as that
“which define the metes and bounds of the invention”33 and to patent
infringement as “trespass.”34 Thus, no one expressed shock or confusion
Wright eds., 2011) [hereinafter Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions]
(discussing property conveyance concepts and doctrines in patent law); Adam Mossoff, Patents
as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700–07 (2007) (discussing protection of patents under the Takings
Clause); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 989–1009
(2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege”] (discussing property concepts,
doctrines and rhetoric in patent law).
28. See Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 994 & n.194
(listing numerous nineteenth-century cases in which judges identified patents as titles).
29. Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742) (Woodbury,
Circuit Justice).
30. Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 993 & n.192 (listing
patent cases referring to or citing common law cases involving trespass).
31. Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,719) (Washington,
Circuit Justice).
32. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917) (explaining that the “scope of every patent . . . . ha[s] been aptly likened to the
description in a deed”) (citations omitted)); United States. v. Société Anonyme Des Anciens
Etablissements Cail, 224 U.S. 309, 311 (1912) (explaining that “the question being only for the
present whether such use was a trespass upon the rights of the claimant”).
33. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
Kara Tech. Inc., v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is the claims that
define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s invention.”); Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,
178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of
the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the protected invention.” (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 607 (1950))); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which
the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected
invention.” (citing Graver, 339 U.S. at 607)).
34. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007); accord Hoechst-Roussel
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when Judge Frank Easterbrook stated at a conference in 1990 that
“[p]atents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with
real property.”35
In recent years, though, patent scholars have fixated on the trespass
analogy and on the related simile that patent claims are the equivalent of
fences around a parcel of land.36 As one patent scholar bluntly puts the
point: “Patent law is about building fences.”37 Of course, as will be
explained later, there is a subtle conflation here between metes and
bounds and fences, i.e., between the description in a deed of the
boundaries of the legal concept of real estate and the physical
demarcation of a parcel of earth secured as real estate. The important
point here is that patent scholars took an analogy and a related simile
that originally served an explanatory function in framing the property
doctrines in patent law and transmogrified it into a normative standard
for evaluating the operation of the patent system as such.
This subtle but important shift from descriptive framing device to
normative standard of evaluation occurred without much comment, but
it did occur. The invocation of the trespass standard—real property has
clear physical boundaries secured by a determinate legal doctrine—is
omnipresent in the ubiquitous complaints today about “the broken
patent system.” For instance, Professors Michael Meurer and James
Bessen explicitly state in their book, Patent Failure, that “[a]n ideal
patent system features rights that are defined as clearly as the fence
Pharm., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“With respect to direct
infringement, then, the claims define the patent owner’s property rights whereas infringement is
the act of trespassing upon those rights.”); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“An act of infringement—i.e., making, using, or selling the patented invention
‘without authority,’—trespasses on this right to exclude.” (citation omitted)).
35. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 108, 109 (1990).
36. See, e.g., ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 73 (2d ed.
2004) (“If patent infringement can be compared to trespassing, the claims serve as the boundary
markers that define what is, or is not, an encroachment on the inventor’s exclusive territory.”);
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2010) (“Because patent
claims define infringement, they are generally regarded as the boundary of a patent, much as the
boundaries of real property define trespass and the right of exclusion.” (footnote omitted));
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the
Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007) (“A patent’s claims define with words the
limits of the inventor’s exclusive rights, just as physical boundaries may define the limits of real
property rights.”); Scott G. Ulbrich, Festo, Notice and the Application of Prosecution History
Estoppel to Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1165, 1168
(2002) (“It is helpful to visualize the universe of all patentable subject matter as a large piece of
real estate. Each patent is defined by the fence around smaller portions of the initial piece of
land.”).
37. Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759,
759 (1999).
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around a piece of land.”38 In Fixing Patent Boundaries, Professor TunJen Chiang contrasts the “vague” and “easily changed” patent claims
with the “stable boundaries” provided by “a fence that is crystal
clear.”39 According to Professor Chiang, this is a problem that demands
a solution because this “lack of stable boundaries . . . has sparked an
explosion in patent litigation, and acts as a deterrent to productive
investment in manufacturing, research, and innovation.”40 Other
scholars use the trespass standard to argue that we should reject the
claim that patents are conceptually and doctrinally equivalent to
property rights.41
In sum, commentators and judges employ a trespass standard to
evaluate, or more precisely to criticize, the operation of the patent
system today. It is alleged that trespass doctrine is determinate and
efficient because fences define clear physical boundaries for real estate.
Thus, patents, or more precisely patent claims, should be as equally
clear as fences and thus as equally determinate as trespass doctrine.42
Yet, everyone seems to agree that patents are vague, indeterminate, and
inordinately expensive to obtain and to litigate. Patents are
“probabilistic rights” of indefinite scope; as Professor Chiang laments,
it is as if “the fence on your land was constantly moving in random
directions. . . . Because patent claims are easily changed, they serve as
poor boundaries, undermining the patent system for everyone.”43 Thus,
the conclusion seems inescapable: the patent system is fundamentally
38. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 46.
39. Chiang, supra note 36, at 525, 530.
40. Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
41. See William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights:
The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327,
329 (2009) (explaining that “when determining boundaries, the analogies between patents and
traditional notions of property rights become less useful and potentially misleading,” and that
the many real-world differences between the two suggests that “the ‘metes and bounds’ analogy
is a legal fiction that is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, misleading”); Mark Lemley, Reply,
What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097–1100 (2005)
(arguing that “the economic theory of real property falls short when applied to the rather
different world of intellectual property” in part because “the law of real property works [given]
that both the physical and legal boundaries of real property are, in the main, clear” but that
“[n]either ‘boundary’ is clear in intellectual property law”).
42. It is not just academic commentators who invoke the trespass/fence standard for
evaluating patents. Judges on the Federal Circuit often invoke it, but positively. See, e.g.,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (asserting that “a patent may be thought of as a form of deed which sets out the
metes and bounds of the property the inventor owns for the term and puts the world on notice to
avoid trespass or to enable one to purchase all or part of the property right it represents”), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
43. Chiang, supra note 36, at 530.
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broken, and the need for reform is as obvious as the sky is blue.44
II. TRESPASS AS A FALLACY IN PATENT LAW
The problem with the trespass standard in patent law is that it is
fundamentally mistaken—it is conceptually invalid and empirically
unverified. In converting a descriptive analogy into a normative
standard, the advocates of the indeterminacy critique have created a
fallacy—the trespass fallacy. Conceptually, this standard improperly
compares the boundaries of a complete legal right (patent) with a single
doctrine (trespass) that constitutes only one part of another legal right
(real estate). Empirically, this standard asserts without any actual proof
whatsoever that boundary disputes of real estate are clear, determinate,
and efficient. Neither of these points represents an insurmountable
problem for the indeterminacy critique; it is possible for the critique to
be reframed and for supporting studies to be done. But until these
failings are addressed, the indeterminacy critique is based on a fallacy—
it is not a sound argument—and thus it should not be used to justify
judicial or legislative reforms of the patent system.
A. The Trespass Standard as a Logical Fallacy
Comparing how different types of property rights function in the real
world is often an important and enlightening inquiry; in fact, it reflects
the essence of the analogical reasoning at the core of legal analysis. In
conceptual or policy analyses of legal rights, such comparisons can
reveal “the appropriate descriptive and normative inputs that go into a
coherent and comprehensive account of a legal doctrine.”45 For
instance, these comparisons can reveal how different property rights,
such as those in land and in inventions, have specific built-in policy
presumptions that guide their application in varying contexts, whether it
is securing a domain of liberty in the free use of an asset46 or reducing
information costs in the efficiency-maximizing uses of assets.47
But this comparison can only work if it is in fact valid, i.e., if there is
appropriate conceptual symmetry between the items of comparison. As
Judge Kent humorously pointed out, one cannot compare “Tuesday”
44. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 171 (“The primary objective of reform
should be to reduce the uncertainty that now pervades many aspects of the patent system.”).
45. Mossoff, supra note 4, at 370.
46. See Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, J.
TORT L., Sept. 2011, at 1, 3 (“Trade secrecy sounds in property—if and to the extent that one
agrees that ‘property’ consists conceptually of a right securing a normative interest in
determining exclusively the use of an external asset.”).
47. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
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and “Philadelphia” as conceptual equivalents, at least if one wants to
engage in rational, coherent discourse.48 This type of identity
proposition conflates two different concepts as allegedly sharing the
exact same characteristics; as a matter of logic, it commits what
philosophers call a “category mistake.”49
In comparing legal rights for either descriptive or normative
purposes, it is paramount to bear in mind that a legal right is not the
same thing as a single doctrine that provides redress for a particular way
the legal right is violated. Logically, a right or legal entitlement is an
abstract concept that subsumes a variety of doctrines that secure this
right in different contexts. In constitutional law, for instance, a “civil
right” is a concept that encompasses a variety of different legal rights,
such as the right to free speech, the right to freedom of religion, the
right to a jury trial, the right to be secure against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the right to due process, among many others. These
more specific legal rights subsume various doctrines, such as the free
speech doctrine defining and permitting time–manner–place
regulations.50 Similarly, a “property right” is a broad concept that
encompasses a variety of different types of legal rights that secure
exclusive use in a valued asset or resource, such as a fee simple in land,
a right to spectrum, a right in oil, a riparian right, a right to corporate
stock, a right of way, and a right to an invention, among many others.
Each of these species of rights within the broader category has further
specific doctrines that apply in the myriad circumstances in which these
rights are utilized by the right holders or violated by third parties, such
as the unauthorized diversion of water from a farmer’s stream.51 When
comparing different types of rights or doctrines subsumed within a
broader right, a proper comparison of the fundamental policy
presumptions that unite these rights or doctrines within the broader
category can be illuminating. However, mistaken conceptual
comparisons merely obfuscate and ultimately frustrate this same
analysis.52
In comparing different property rights, it is important logically to
recognize that the boundaries of legal title—whether in real estate or a
48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
49. See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 55–56 (2d ed. rev.
2008) (“A category mistake arises when things or facts of one kind are presented as if they
belonged to another.”).
50. E.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions.”).
51. See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 333–35 (discussing water rights).
52. See id. at 376–77.
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patent—is not the same thing as trespass doctrine. To claim as identical
the boundaries of legal title and trespass is tantamount to claiming that
the broader concept of fruit is identical with an orange rind. This type of
identity proposition conflates two different concepts as allegedly
sharing the exact same characteristics; in short, it commits a category
mistake. Assuming that such comparisons can be valid and that they
illuminate valid policy issues in property law, logic then requires that
there be conceptual symmetry between the items of comparison. Thus,
commentators and judges should compare a patent to its proper
conceptual counterpart in real property—an estate.
Somehow the significance of the hoary truism that “patents
are . . . title deeds”53 has been lost on modern patent commentators and
courts. All law students learn in their first-year property course that an
estate is not the same thing as land.54 It is a basic axiom in property law
that the physical boundaries of a parcel of land are not the same thing as
the legal boundaries of an estate, which is measured in its most basic
sense in terms of temporal duration.55 The largest estate, a fee simple
absolute, is measured not just along the dimension of time; since this
estate secures exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition,56 it is
measured along functional and physical dimensions as well.57 This is
53. Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1,434).
54. See, e.g., Eaton v. B.C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872) (“In a strict legal sense,
land is not ‘property,’ but the subject of property.”); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433
(1856) (Seldon, J.) (“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a
thing. The term, although frequently applied to the thing itself, in strictness means only the
rights of the owner in relation to it.”).
55. See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
33 (4th ed. 2005) (“The theory of estates, a peculiarity of Anglo-American law, is based on the
concept of ownership measured in terms of time.”); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 10 (2d ed.
1899) (“Proprietary rights in land are . . . projected upon the plane of time. The category of
quantity, of duration, is applied to them.”).
56. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (explaining that
“property” has a “vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the
citizen exercises rights,” but that “in a more accurate sense” the concept of property denotes
“the right to possess, use and dispose of it”); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917)
(“Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the
right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.”); Eaton, 51 N.H. at 511 (“Property is the right of any
person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.” (quoting Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 433
(Seldon, J.))).
57. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318
(2002) (“Property interests may have many different dimensions. For example, the dimensions
of a property interest may include a physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of
the property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner
may use or dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the
duration of the property interest).” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
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such a basic fact in the American property system that no one thinks
twice about how fee simple owners carve up their estates precisely
along these different dimensions, such as use (easements and restrictive
covenants) and time (future interests). On the basis of defining patents
as property, early nineteenth-century American courts secured to patent
owners the exact same conveyance rights in their “titles,” incorporating
into patent law the common law property concepts of “assignments”
and “licenses.”58
To put the point bluntly, a fence does not define the boundaries of an
estate, whether in fee simple or in any estate of lesser quantum. For
property lawyers, this is anything but a surprising statement. Courts
have long recognized that property rights can be violated without any
breach of a fence or physical removal of an object from one’s
possession. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in 1856,
“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of
a thing. . . . A man may be deprived of his property in a chattel,
therefore, without its being seized or physically destroyed, or taken
from his possession.”59
This is why first-year property courses spend little time studying
common law trespass or conversion.60 Instead, property professors
spend almost the entirety of their courses studying the doctrines
securing a property-owner’s rights to possession, use, and enjoyment,
and the creation and use of estate interests along these dimensions. This
includes the many doctrines that define and secure the rights of
possession, use, and disposition, such as adverse possession, finder and
gift doctrines, possessory estates (e.g., leaseholds, life estates, fee
simple defeasibles, joint tenancies, etc.), future interests (reversions,
remainders, and executory interests), easements arising by implication
from licenses, prescriptive easements, restrictive covenants, and
nuisance. All of these doctrines define the boundaries of an estate, both
intensively and extensively, and only a few rely on physical breaches of
fences to define when this estate has been invaded.
For example, many property lawsuits arise from disputed wills and
other title-creating documents, such as a deed creating an easement.
Accordingly, these disputes often focus on the meaning of words in the
deed or conveyance instrument, a legal practice that many patent
lawyers would find eerily similar to the disputes over words in patent
Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2000))).
58. See generally Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions, supra note 27,
at 350–56; Mossoff, supra note 4, at 349–60.
59. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 433.
60. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 69–80, 87–92 (6th ed. 2006); THOMAS
W. MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1–6, 401–28 (1st ed. 2007).
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claims. And these real estate disputes are not resolved just by the
substantive meaning of the legal terms of art or non-technical words
used within the four corners of the conveyance instrument; rather,
formal legal rules, such as rules of construction and substantive
presumptions, play a fundamental and often determinative role in these
court cases. As patent lawyers know all too well, the same holds true for
patent disputes, although contrary to many claims, this is not a modern
artifact of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence. In
1833, Justice Joseph Story, riding circuit, resolved one complicated
patent assignment case by looking to “strong[] analogous cases” in the
common law in which courts recognized the legitimacy of “the deeds”
conveying land even if a “feoffment is stated without any averment of
livery of seisin.”61 Such language in patent decisions might send shivers
down the spines of lawyers who remember all too well having to learn
such archaic legal terminology in their first-year property courses, much
of which continues to be in use in property law today.
In fact, the hyper-technical and highly formalistic estate interests are
very similar to patents in both content and form. Patent scholars might
be surprised to learn that the term “incorporeal property” first arose at
common law in cases involving future interests.62 The similarities,
though, are deeper than mere terminology. In terms of subject matter,
disputes over future interests are disputes about the precise scope of the
estate; the overlapping possessory estates and future interests create
legal rights and duties between the respective owners of the estate, such
as the restraints imposed on life tenants by remaindermen.63 Such
overlapping estate interests are similar to the overlapping patent
interests covering a single product or process,64 which often precipitates
61. Dobson v. Campbell, 7 F. Cas. 783, 785 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 3,945) (Story,
Circuit Justice). In this case, Circuit Justice Story was required to assess whether the assignment
“set[] up a title to the patent right” sufficient to support a claim for infringement by the
plaintiff–assignee. Id. The sticking point was that the assignment was not recorded with the
Secretary of State, as required by the 1793 Patent Act. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 4, 1
Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836). Invoking the equity cases upholding real property interests
transferred without the requisite legal formalities, Circuit Justice Story held that the assignee
had a sufficient legal interest to sue for infringement. Dobson, 7 F. Cas. at 785.
62. See FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN
THE COMMON LAW 54 (1888) (“With regard to incorporeal hereditaments, such as a reversion, a
remainder, an advowson, the established theory of our authorities is that, although one may have
seisin of them by receiving the rent and services, or presenting a clerk to the church, they are not
the subjects of livery of seisin; they lie in grant, that is, they can be alienated only by deed.”).
63. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Ga. 1996) (holding that a life
tenant forfeited his estate in favor of the remaindermen given the life tenant’s failure to pay real
estate taxes).
64. See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 330–35 (discussing blocking patents and how this
corresponds to similar situations in tangible property rights).
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extensive litigation known today as a “patent thicket.”65 In terms of
legal doctrine, future interests are governed by hyper-technical and
formalistic legal rules, and, as property lawyers are wont to point out,
such rules refer only to the abstract legal right created in the conveyance
instrument, not to the land.66 Again, patent lawyers should feel right at
home here, because the legal construction of hyper-technical patent
claims is at the core of every infringement lawsuit. As the Federal
Circuit puts the point, “the name of the game is the claim.”67
The many cases involving disputes over estates and future interests
dramatically reveal these points of similarity between the interests
secured in real estate and patents. To take just one illustrative example:
in Illinois in the mid-1970s, a dispute arose over who owned a future
interest in a fee simple defeasible, as the interest was transferred under
different circumstances and at different times to different parties.68
Similar to the rules governing construction of all legal documents,
including patents,69 the court followed the uncontroversial proposition
that the interpretation of deeds “is solely a matter of judicial
interpretation of the words of a grant.”70
As in all property disputes concerning estate interests, the parties in
this case heavily disputed the meaning of the words used in the deed.71
Of course, the language was neither clear nor straightforward, as is
often the case in these lawsuits. This is why there is litigation, as there
are colorable arguments on both sides of the dispute. Ultimately, the
court concluded that
a close analysis of the wording of the original grant shows
that . . . . the use of the word “only” immediately following
65. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket:
The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011).
66. See Wood v. Leadbitter, [1845] 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch.) 354, 13 M. & W. 838, 842
(“That no incorporeal inheritance affecting land can either be created or transferred otherwise
than by deed, is a proposition so well established, that it would be mere pedantry to cite
authorities in its support. All such inheritances are said emphatically to lie in grant, and not in
livery [of seisin] . . . .”); cf. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 60, at 182 (“The development of the
fee simple estate is an example of that most striking phenomenon of English land law, the
reification of abstractions, a process of thinking that still pervades our law. Instead of thinking
of the land itself, the lawyer thinks of an estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a
real existence apart from the land.”).
67. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)).
68. See Mahrenholz v. Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 417 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
69. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
70. Mahrenholz, 417 N.E.2d at 141.
71. Id. at 142–45 (reviewing the parties’ competing arguments).
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the grant “for school purpose” demonstrates that the
Huttons wanted to give the land to the school district only
as long as it was needed and no longer. . . . It suggests a
limited grant, rather than a full grant subject to a condition,
and thus, both theoretically and linguistically, gives rise to
a fee simple determinable.72
This type of formalistic, linguistic analysis of a deed is quite
common in property law disputes, and state reporters are littered with
opinions just like this one. Patent lawyers should find such arguments to
be quite familiar, as these arguments are very similar to the rules and
practices they face each day when courts or officials at the Patent &
Trademark Office parse the words and grammatical structures of claims,
applying definitions as well as grammatical and legal rules. In sum, the
descriptive similarities between patents and future interests are palpable,
which explains why nineteenth-century courts relied on real property
cases, or at least analogized patent doctrines to real property doctrines,
in creating parallel doctrines in patent law.
Beyond these similarities between patents and estate interests, there
are other doctrines that define the boundaries of an estate without
reference to either fences or the physical invasion that constitutes a
trespass. For example, the owner of an easement can breach the larger
estate in which the right of way exists without overstepping a single
physical boundary line. All that is required is that the easement owner
merely increases the “scope of use” of the easement, which is a breach
of the estate boundaries along the functional dimension in terms of the
scope of the use right originally created in the easement.73 In such cases,
courts have no problem identifying the legal wrong as a “trespass” in
the strictly legal sense of the term, referring to a legal violation of the
boundaries of an estate interest.74 But this is certainly not the sense of
“trespass” employed by laypersons or patent lawyers, who think of only
broken fences and physical invasions. Another example is the wellknown action for nuisance—a substantial and unreasonable interference
with another person’s use and enjoyment of land—which is a very
common way that an estate can be violated without a breach of a fence
or a physical invasion of the land.75 One scholar explored recently how
72. Id. at 142.
73. See, e.g., Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
74. See, e.g., Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 233 (Va. 1946) (stating that
“every use of an easement not necessarily included in the grant is a trespass to realty and renders
the owner of the dominant tenement liable”); Brown, 715 P.2d at 518 (Dore, J., dissenting)
(“Misuse of an easement is a trespass.”).
75. See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) (“If the intrusion
interferes with the right to exclusive possession of property, the law of trespass applies. If the
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nuisance doctrine illuminates the same policy concerns about
information costs in the structure of patent infringement doctrine,76 but
this comparison beyond the conventional contrast between patent
infringement and trespass is the exception, not the rule.
Courts and commentators probably fail to see these many
correlations and instead find the trespass fallacy so appealing because it
reflects symmetry between the exclusionary right in a patent and the
exclusionary right in real estate. Today, patents and real estate are both
deemed to secure an owner’s right to exclude others from the subject
matter of the property right.77 But the framing of patent infringement as
trespass is only an analogy, as evidenced by early American courts’
using the trespass analogy long before American patents specifically
defined the peripheral boundaries of the property right in formal
“claims.”78 The characterization of patent infringement as “trespass” in
Antebellum Era case law—when a patent described the “principle” of
an invention79—underscores how courts and commentators at that time
used this term only as an analogy for framing the protection of patents
as property rights (as opposed to personal privileges or franchise
monopoly grants).80 Ironically, while criticizing the use of property
metaphors as obfuscating policy issues in intellectual property law,81
intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of property, the law of nuisance applies.”);
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“Nuisance is not
contingent upon whether the defendant physically impinged on plaintiff’s property, but whether
the defendant substantially and unreasonably interfered with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of its
property.”); cf. Adam Mossoff, Spam—Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625,
646–54 (2004) (discussing how the legal harm imposed by spam is properly characterized as a
nuisance as opposed to a trespass).
76. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
61 (2009).
77. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (identifying the right to
exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of
‘property.’”); see also Mossoff, supra note 4, at 327–30, 360–64 (explaining how real property
and patents are both defined in modern property theory as essentially securing a right to
exclude).
78. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (discussing
how claims did not originally exist in American patent law).
79. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617–18 (C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1,506)
(instructing a jury that “in his specification, the patentee explains the principle embodied in his
machine, in other words, the novel characteristics or inventive elements of the machine”
(emphasis added)).
80. See generally Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 989–
1009 (identifying how American courts, legislators, and commentators historically justified
patents as property rights within natural rights theory).
81. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX.
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patent scholars have converted the trespass analogy into the trespass
fallacy and thus obfuscated what it means to define and secure a patent
as a property right.
In sum, a comparison between patents and real estate should
comprise all doctrines that define and secure the boundaries of these
respective titles. This certainly includes trespass, but this single doctrine
is not sufficient. As the Colorado Supreme Court aptly observed,
“Property, in its broader and more appropriate sense, is not alone the
chattel or the land itself, but the right to freely possess, use, and alienate
the same.”82 If the boundaries of patents are to be compared to the
boundaries of real estate, then commentators and judges must include
the doctrines that secure the temporal, geographic, and functional
dimensions and which together define the scope of a property right
secured in an estate. The trespass fallacy must be discarded and the
comparisons made anew based on the proper conceptual counterpart to
patents—estates. Commentators and judges should stop talking about
patent boundaries in terms of fences, as this analogy has led them
astray, and instead they should be talking about estate boundaries.
B. Trespass as an Unverified Empirical Metric
If patent scholars and economists make a proper comparison
between patent boundaries and estate boundaries, they must still
empirically verify whether estate boundaries are as clear and
determinate as they assume them to be. In all empirical studies, the
omnipresent question is always: As compared to what?83 The trespass
fallacy is invalid not just because it reflects the logical fallacy of a
category mistake, but also because it reflects a metric for empirically
assessing the operation of the patent system that is completely
unsubstantiated and unverified. In short, there are no empirical studies
of how trespass functions in real-world litigation, and there certainly are
no empirical studies of the proper metric that scholars should be using
in their comparative statics of the patent system—estate boundaries.
Surprisingly, patent scholars have been engaging in substantial
L. REV. 1031, 1071 (2005) (“My worry is that the rhetoric of property has a clear meaning in the
minds of courts, lawyers, and commentators as ‘things that are owned by persons’ and that fixed
meaning will make it all too tempting to fall into the trap of treating intellectual property as an
absolute right to exclude.”).
82. City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 6–7 (Colo. 1883) (emphasis omitted).
83. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities
in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7–9), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117421 (critiquing a study by Professors Bessen and Meurer on the
costs of litigation by nonpracticing entities for failing properly to establish that nonpracticing
entity litigation costs are “statistically different from some other number” because they
“unrealistic[ally] . . . assume that the costs should be zero”).
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empirical studies of the patent system in recent years, but they have
been merely asserting without any proof that real estate boundaries are
stable, determinate, and efficient. One of the most extensive empirical
studies of the modern patent system is by Professors Bessen and
Meurer, as presented in their book, Patent Failure.84 They infer the
indeterminacy critique from their study and thus call for wide-ranging
reforms of the patent system.85 As previously noted, they invoke the
trespass fallacy in this book,86 but what is perhaps most surprising is
that they do so on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Although
they carefully collected extensive data on the issuance and litigation of
patents, they do not offer a single formal empirical study to verify their
assertion that “[r]eal property law gives landowners a clear view of
property boundaries,” and thus one “rarely hear[s] about lawsuits
caused because someone inadvertently built a structure on, or made
some other investment within the boundaries of, another’s property.”87
In support of this empirical claim about how real property boundaries
function at all times and in every common law jurisdiction in the United
States, they offer the following statement in a single endnote: “Over the
past three years there have been only four lawsuits in California
concerning good-faith improvement of land.”88 This is it. There are no
statistical or other empirical studies cited to support this claim, either
limited to California or to any other jurisdiction for that matter.
Unfortunately, Professors Bessen and Meurer’s lack of concern for
providing any proper evidence in support of their invocation of the
trespass standard is not unusual among scholars today. Patent scholars
often assert similarly unsubstantiated claims that real property
boundaries function clearly and efficiently in the real world.89
It is not for lack of available evidence that such studies have not
been done. As Justice Stephen Breyer recently observed in an important
2010 decision, “[p]roperty owners litigate many thousands of cases
involving state property law in state courts each year,” and, tellingly, he
further recognized that “such cases can involve state property law issues
of considerable complexity.”90 The few empirical studies on real estate
84. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2.
85. Id. at 235–53.
86. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
87. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 51.
88. Id. at 266 n.8.
89. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 36 at 530 (“Property rights generally have a degree of
stability to facilitate investment by their owners and others.”); Lemley, supra note 41, at 1100
(“One of the reasons we are reasonably confident that the law of real property works is that both
the physical and legal boundaries of real property are, in the main, clear.”).
90. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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boundaries and casual surveys of anecdotal evidence suggest that
Justice Breyer’s observation on the substantial number and complexity
of real estate boundary disputes carries more truth than the assumption
of patent scholars to the contrary.91 It bears emphasizing, though, that
even if patent scholars eventually produce empirical studies on trespass
lawsuits throughout the United States, there still remains the conceptual
fallacy in using trespass doctrine as the sole metric in evaluating the
patent system. Thus, for the indeterminacy critique to have any traction
beyond appeals to simplistic and unverified intuitions that trespass
works efficiently via the crystal-clear signaling function of fences, the
empirical studies have to assess how estate boundaries are defined and
adjudicated in real-world disputes.
This requires data collection and modeling of how estate boundaries
work along two different axes of measurement. Before identifying these
two axes of measurement, it bears noting that a full empirical study is
beyond the scope of this Essay; in fact, to attempt to present a complete
study of estate boundary disputes in this section would result in the
same conceptual and empirical problems identified in this Essay. Thus,
what follows is only a summary of the various factors that such a study
91. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of
Coordinating Institutions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. l4942),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401787 (identifying differing economic effects between
rectangular system and metes and bounds for demarcating boundaries of real property); see also
Tami Abdolla & Maria L. La Ganga, Building a Fence Is His Big Offense, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/29/local/me-house29 (reporting that a homeowner
was sentenced to jail for six months for building a fence in violation of municipal codes in
California); Molly Moorhead, Feud over Fence in Middle of Hudson Road May Go to Trial,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 9, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/feudover-fence-in-middle-of-hudson-road-may-go-to-trial/1072038 (reporting ongoing boundary
dispute in Florida); Jerry Seper, 16 Illegals Sue Arizona Rancher, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/9/16-illegals-sue-arizona-rancher (reporting
on how a rancher was sued for apprehending illegal immigrants trespassing on his land in
Arizona); James Eli Shiffer, Whistleblower: Drawing the Line in Land Squabble, STAR TRIB.
(June 13, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/96222009.html
(reporting ongoing and highly emotional boundary dispute in Minnesota); Brandon Shulleeta,
Crozet Square Dispute Still Unresolved, D AILY P ROGRESS (June 30, 2010, 4:47 AM),
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/article_3fb99225-58b5-5979-9017-afd948334b
9b.html (“Crozet business owners had been struck with panic—witnessing a railroad company
claim ownership of their shopping center parking lot and erecting a fence—and the property
dispute remains unresolved now a month later.”); Paul Sullivan, Somebody’s Watching . . . and
Ready to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/yourmoney/05wealth.html (discussing hundreds of thousands of dollars being spent in Connecticut
in a boundary dispute involving a stone wall); Superior Man Arrested for Trespassing on His
Own Land, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Dec. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24539844 (reporting
how a landowner was arrested for criminal trespass for interfering with a public utility easement
on his land).
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would have to account for, with some citations to show that such legal
and factual disputes over real estate boundaries are both common and
quite significant today.
First, data on all of the relevant doctrines that comprise estate
boundaries must be collected and tested to determine if they confirm the
asserted hypothesis that estate boundaries are determinate and efficient
vis-à-vis indeterminate and inefficient patent boundaries. For this claim
to be sufficiently robust, the data must capture all of the ways that estate
boundaries are defined and disputed, including disputes concerning
trespass,92 adverse possession,93 easements,94 restrictive covenants,95
and nuisance,96 among other doctrines identified in the previous section.
Most important, it would have to include the innumerable interpretative
disputes over the wills, deeds, and conveyance instruments that define
these boundaries along the multi-dimensions of an estate. As property
attorneys know, many property disputes comprise linguistic fights over
the legal definitions of estates and related legal terms of art in property
law—similar to the linguistic fights in patent law over the meaning of
claim terms.97 As Frederick Pollock and Robert Wright observed in
92. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1306, 1308 (11th
Cir. 2007) (affirming judgment holding defendant liable in trespass action for almost $1.9
million in damages, punitive damages of $17.5 million, and attorneys’ fees in excess of $1
million).
93. See, e.g., Sag Harbor Village to Bid on MTA Parcel, SAG HARBOR EXPRESS (July 16,
2010), http://sagharboronline.com/sagharborexpress/page-1/sag-harbor-village-to-bid-on-mtaparcel-8542 (discussing ongoing adverse possession dispute in property concurrently being
auctioned by local authorities).
94. See, e.g., Sampair v. Vill. of Birchwood, 784 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 2010) (resolving
dispute over lakeshore access between landowners and easement owners); Jenna Russell,
Wrangling over Ancient Ways, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR
2629127 (discussing long-running disputes over easements on Martha’s Vineyard).
95. See, e.g., Jordan Schrader, Clotheslines a Hang-up for Some Communities, USA
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-09-07-clotheslines_N.htm.
96. See, e.g., Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1188, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007)
(affirming an order remanding to state court a nuisance claim involving 409 plaintiffs); Powell
v. Tosh, 280 F.R.D. 296, 300 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (certifying a class action in a nuisance lawsuit
against a hog farm); Justin Jouvenal, Fairfax County Church Takes Action Against TopGolf
Driving Range for Wayward Golf Balls, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-05/local/35282128_1_joe-vrankin-special-grandjury-church-property (reporting how a church is formally accusing a local golf range of being a
public nuisance); ‘Neighbour from Hell’ Madonna Accused of Turning Her £4M NYC Home into
Rehearsal Space, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article1221249/Neighbour-hell-Madonna-accused-turning-4m-NYC-home-rehearsal-space.html (reporting
on nuisance-style interferences between neighboring tenants in skyscrapers); Teri Karush Rogers,
The Big Mistake, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/realestate/06
cov.html (same).
97. See, e.g., Bailey v. Town of Saltville, 691 S.E.2d 491, 491, 494 (Va. 2010) (resolving
dispute over whether the language in a deed granted an easement or a fee simple); Burdette v.
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their famous 1888 treatise, An Essay on Possession in the Common
Law, “Few title-deeds are so precise in their description of the property
dealt with as to leave nothing uncertain.”98
The ubiquitous terminological disputes concerning the scope of
estate boundaries are a stark reminder that the conventional wisdom
about the allegedly unparalleled debacle in claim interpretation
jurisprudence is untested and unverified. Perhaps this complaint
represents merely a pining for an idealized certainty in language that is
just not possible in any legal document that creates legal entitlements,
whether a title deed, a statute, or a patent.99 Perhaps not. Perhaps it
represents a pining for an unrealistic, idealized certainty in litigation
generally.100 Perhaps not.
To this day, the vitally important question remains unanswered: Do
patents secure boundaries in inventions with the same certainty as title
deeds secure boundaries in real estate? It is time to properly test
whether there is unacceptable indeterminacy or not in the functioning of
patents as property rights
Second, a proper empirical study of estate boundaries must also
guard against self-selection bias in focusing solely on court cases
arising from formal complaints asserting property-based causes of
action.101 In addition to the many boundary disputes that are resolved at
the stage in which attorneys exchange letters or even before a trial
occurs, many property disputes are channeled today through various
Brush Mountain Estates, LLC, 682 S.E.2d 549, 551, 555–56 (Va. 2009) (holding that a
conveyance deed containing the express words “PRIVATE EASEMENT . . . IS HEREBY
CONVEYED” did not create an easement given that the plat did not specify with precision the
burden imposed by the easement and the plat showed the easement covering land not included
in the original survey of the parcel); see also Confused Land Records Lead to Dueling Deeds,
ROCKBRIDGE ADVOC., March 2008, at 1, 6–10 (on file with author); Roger Vincent, Downtown
L.A. Building Set to Go from Drug Den to Luxury Inn, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/23/business/la-fi-downtown-hotel-20120223 (reporting on
how development of a valuable parcel was held up for many years given “difficulty figuring out
who held its title as competing parties claimed control”).
98. POLLOCK & WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 30.
99. Cf. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958)
(“[I]f the language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can demand no more.”).
100. At a minimum, the substantial reversal rate in claim construction cases complained
about by patent scholars and judges, see supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text, is consistent
with the famous Priest–Klein hypothesis that litigation generally approaches a 50% win-loss
rate. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
101. In addition to the lack of any formal support for their empirical claim about the
alleged clarity of real estate boundaries, Bessen and Meurer’s informal review of trespass court
cases in California between 2005 and 2008 suffers from obvious self-selection effects that they
do not control for. This is a similar problem to the self-selection effects in their 2012 study of
nonpracticing entity litigation. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 83, at 4–6.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/1

22

Mossoff: The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law

2013]

THE TRESPASS FALLACY IN PATENT LAW

1709

dispute-resolution mechanisms outside of the classic lawsuit filed with
the clerk in the local courthouse. This includes informal mechanisms,
such as the operation of social norms that resolve boundary disputes
without formal court action,102 and a variety of formal mechanisms
within the modern administrative state, such as zoning, environmental
regulations, and other statutes and regulations that establish nonjudicial
processes to resolve property disputes.103
To date, no patent or property scholar has done a formal study along
either of these two axes of measurement. Thus, commentators
advancing the trespass fallacy have been engaging in comparative
statistics in which one side has been carefully studied with extensive
data collection (patent law) and the other side is almost completely
barren of any facts (property law). In these studies, commentators have
been merely restating the idealized theory of how the right to exclude
functions within trespass doctrine, as it is formally conceptualized
within the economic analysis of property law.104 Commentators
invoking the trespass fallacy simply assume that this classic “property
rule” doctrine works clearly and efficiently.105 In economic terms, the
nirvana fallacy is omnipresent in much empirical scholarship on the
modern patent system.
Aside from the conceptual problems inherent in relying on trespass
doctrine to evaluate patents, an idealized theory about one legal doctrine
(trespass) is not a commensurate standard for doing comparative
102. See, e.g., Drew Grant, D’Amico Coffee Loses Battle over Carroll Gardens’ (Coffee)
Grounds, N.Y. OBSERVER (May 28, 2012), http://observer.com/2012/05/damico-coffee-losesbattle-over-carroll-gardens-grounds (describing how local residents, upset by the smell, shut
down a local coffee shop’s activities by repeatedly making false reports to the fire department);
see also JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48–49, 73–76, 142–44 (1988);
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
103. See, e.g., Abdolla & La Ganga, supra note 91 (reporting that a homeowner was
sentenced to jail for six months for building a fence in violation of municipal building codes);
Matt Miller, Food Truck Wars, DAILY CALLER (Apr. 27, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/04/
27/food-truck-wars/ (reporting on restaurant owners around the country using zoning laws to
eliminate competition from food trucks); Paul Muschick, Zoning Feud Nears End in Allen Twp.,
MORNING CALL (Jan. 14, 2010), http://articles.mcall.com/2010-01-14/news/all-online19ndh-aa.7146058jan14_1_zoning-feud-township-manager-and-zoning-zoning-officer (reporting on a
“long-running zoning feud” in Allen Township, Pennsylvania); Tom Ramstack, Church Sues
District over Landmark, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/
aug/8/church-sues-district-over-landmark (reporting on how a local church is challenging its legal
designation as a historical landmark).
104. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 356 (1967) (observing that “private ownership of land will internalize
many of the external costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of
his power to exclude others, . . . . [has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently”
(emphasis added)).
105. See supra notes 38–41, 87–89 and accompanying text.
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empirical studies of another legal right (patents). As Professors Bessen
and Meurer rightly state, “The problem with mistaking abstract
conceptions of property for the real thing is that this substitutes rhetoric
for reasoned policy . . . .”106 Unfortunately, their study is rife with the
trespass fallacy, and so they are not following their own advice. If the
empirical studies of the patent system are to have a proper explanatory
function, whether in making the indeterminacy critique or in asserting
any other claim about patents, then they have to answer the vital
question: As compared to what? As of yet, this question is unanswered
because the proper estate boundary standard remains empirically
unverified. Of course, it is easy to solve this problem. To borrow
Professors Bessen and Meurer’s own mantra, “The antidote is empirical
evidence . . . .”107
CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom is that the patent system is broken and
requires immediate action to reform it before irreparable harm is done to
both innovation and economic growth in the country. One of the
primary problems, according to many, is that patents today are infected
with vagueness and indeterminacy. As the reform advocates repeatedly
put the point, “The primary objective of reform should be to reduce the
uncertainty that now pervades many aspects of the patent system.”108
The widespread calls for reform by academics, policy activists, lawyers,
and commercial firms have prompted the Supreme Court, the Congress,
and the Patent & Trademark Office to spring into action in recent years,
attempting to address the perceived breakdown in the patent system
with a plethora of fixes both doctrinal and institutional.
The problem is that the charges of rampant indeterminacy in the
patent system are predicated on a fallacy—an improper and unverified
comparison of patent infringement with trespass doctrine. Logically,
this commits a category mistake, as it assumes that the boundaries of
title—whether a property right in an invention or in land—are defined
solely by a single doctrine of trespass subsumed within this property
right. As property lawyers well know, trespass is only one of many
doctrines, including easements, restrictive covenants, and nuisance,
among others, that secure estate boundaries along their geographic,
temporal and functional dimensions. Empirically, there are no formal
studies of how trespass doctrine functions in litigation, nor are there any
studies of the proper comparative concept of how estate boundaries
106. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 257.
107. Id.
108. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 171.
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function in litigation. Commentators are committing the nirvana fallacy
in their comparative statics—comparing actual empirical data from the
patent system with an idealized theory of how trespass should be
functioning. In sum, the indeterminacy critique is the product of a
fallacy in patent law today—the trespass fallacy.
If one believes that there is value in the policy insights obtained from
comparisons between different types of property rights, then the
trespass fallacy should be discarded in favor of a proper descriptive and
empirical account of estate boundaries. As the legal realists reminded us
so long ago, normative assessments of the law are “empty without
objective description of the causes and consequences of legal
decisions.”109 As of now, there is no objective description of real estate
to support the comparative claim in the indeterminacy critique that
patents are failing as property rights. Until firm factual grounding for
this normative critique is first established, commentators, legislators and
courts might want to pause before continuing to make fundamental
structural changes to the American patent system.

109. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 849 (1935).
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